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statement	by	another	agent	with	opinion	values	(e2,	i2)	 	[0,	1]2,	it	will	acquire	new	opinion	values	defined	by	the	functions	AE	:	[0,	1]2	 	[0,	1]	and	AI	:	[0,	1]2×[0,	1]2	 	[0,	1]
AE(e1,	e2) = 2e1e2 if	e1,	e2	 	0.5
	 = 2e1	+2e2	-2e1e2	-1						 if	e1,	e2	 	0.5
















































































4.14 	A	notion	similar	to	linguistic	consistency	in	fuzzy	logic	is	known	as:	convexity.	A	fuzzy	set	 	is	convex	iff	for	all	x	<	y	<	z	holds:	 (y)	 	min( (x), (z))	(Pedrycz	&	Gomide	1998).
4.15 	We	call	X	 	Si	convex	with	respect	to	issue	i	when	we	have:	
x,	y	 	X s	 Si(x	<	i	s	<	i	y	 	s	 X)
Definition	5	(Linguistic	Consistency)			An	opinion	function	Bela	is	linguistically	consistent	if	the	following	holds:

















































<	Europeanism	=	{ 	 (C,	A),(C,	E),(E,	A),(C,	F), 	
	 	 (F,	A),(F,	B),(D,	F),(D,	G),(G,	B)} 	
and	
<	KeynesianMonetarist	=	{ 	 (C,	E),(A,	E),(C,	F),(E,	F), 	






























































































































































































Parameter MOAC SOC Reputation
Reputation	Distribution - 0 -	-	-
Spatial	Distribution 0 + +
LOA + + ++
LON - - -	-
Distribution	of	Pop - - -	-
Opinion	Distribution + + +




















































































Parameter Range Value Description
force-of-arguments 0-1 1 Determines	the	degree	in	which	the	agent's	reputation	isdetermined	by	winning	and	losing	debates.
force-of-norms 0-1 0 The	degree	in	which	the	reputation	is	determined	by	thesimilarity	with	its	environment.







chance-walk 0-100 16 Movement	in	the	topic	space.





forgetspeed 0-0.005 0.00106 The	speed	the	evidence-	and	importance-values	of	the	agents'opinion	converges	to	neutral	values	(typically	0.5).
undirectedness 0-45 19 Randomness	of	the	direction	of	movement.
chance-attack 0-100 12 Attack	a	recently	heard	announcement.	(The	most	different	one
from	the	own	opinion	with	the	highest	probability)
chance-learn-by-
neighbour 0-10 0.2 Learn	from	the	nearest	neighbour.
chance-learn-by-
environment 0-10 1 Learn	from	the	average	opinion	on	the	agents'	location.
inconspenalty 0-1 0 Penalty	for	having	inconsistent	opinions.
attraction 0-1 0.47
The	largest	distance	in	the	evidence	value	of	an	uttered
proposition	and	the	evidence	value	of	the	same	proposition	of	a
receiving	agent	for	which	the	receiver	is	inclined	to	adjust	its
opinion.
rejection 0-1 0.47
The	shortest	distance	in	the	evidence	value	of	an	uttered
proposition	and	the	evidence	value	of	the	same	proposition	of	a
receiving	agent	for	which	the	receiver	is	inclined	to	attack	the
uttered	proposition.
	Appendix	C:	The	Actions	of	the	Agents
C.1 	The	flow	of	consequences	of	agents'	actions,	as	performed	in	the	procedure	act,	is	shown	in	an	UML	sequence	diagram	in	Figure	14.	The	numbers	in	the	enumeration	refer	to	the	text	labels	on	the	right	side	of	the
sequence	diagram.
Figure	14.	UML	sequence	diagram	of	the	influence	of	opinions.	The	vertical	bars	represent	the	time	lines	of	the	relevant	objects.
The	horizontal	lines	represent	the	events	of	sending	messages	(Synchronous	messages	are	followd	by	a	dashed	line	with	an
arrow	in	the	opposite	directon,	when	the	receiver	returns	the	control	back	to	the	sender).
1.	Agents	utter	their	most	important	opinions	most	frequently.	We	consider	the	case	that	agent	ag1,	represented	by	the	grey	bar	(which	represents	a	thread	-	different	threads	are	denoted	by
different	colours)	on	the	left,	announces	a	statement.	That	event	is	communicated	to	other	agents	in	the	neighbourhood	by	the	message	update-announcement.
C.2 	Whether	a	considered	utterance	will	be	accepted/rejected	depends	on	its	effect	on	the	agent's	attitude.	If	its	attitude	remains	linguistically	consistent	after	acceptance,	then	the	agent	will	accept	the	utterance	(or	its
negation	in	case	of	a	rejection).	In	case	the	agent's	attitude	will	become	inconstent,	the	agent	will	have	to	pay	a	penalty.
C.3 	There	is	a	possibility	that	an	agent	will	learn	from	an	utterance.	In	that	case	consistency	of	the	resulting	attitude	determines	what	will	happen	with	the	agent's	opinions	and	reputation.
C.4 	To	form	a	latitude	(interval),	the	statements	have	to	be	ordered	in	the	degree	of	extremeness	and	that	order	is	fixed	during	the	simulation,	so	the	evidence	assignment	to	the	set	of	statements	needs	to	be	convex	at
the	start.	An	initial	convex	set	of	opinions	remains	convex	by	forbidding	the	acceptance	of	statements	that	would	result	in	an	non-convex	opinion	state.	Instead	of	adding	acceptance	events	as	in	the	'own
categories'	model	to	enforce	assimilation	and	contrast,	we	now	decrease	the	number	of	acceptance	occasions.
C.5 	This	functionality	is	implemented	in	the	update-announcement	procedure:
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if	 	agreement	>	1		-	attraction	 	
then	 	setopinion	announcement	 	
else	if	 	agreement	<	rejection	-		1	 	
then	 	setopinion	negation	of	announcement	 	
C.6 	The	announcement	is	communicated	to	the	patches	in	the	environment	(the	World)	by	the	message	announce.	This	message	applies	the	accept-function	on	the	opinion	values	of	the	announcement	and	the
patches.
2.	Announcements	start	a	sequence	of	attacks	and	defences	in	the	dialogue	game.	The	yellow	thread	represents	another	agent	who	launches	an	attack	on	the	announcement	it	just	heard.	The
attack	itself	is	in	red.	The	likeliness	of	this	event	is	determined	by	the	difference	of	the	agent's	opion	and	the	message.	The	reputation	of	the	agent	needs	to	be	high	enough	to	pay	the	reward	in
case	the	attacker	loses	the	dialogue.	
3.	At	the	end	of	a	round,	the	reputation	of	all	agents	is	adjusted	for	their	similarity	with	their	environment.	It	will	be	increased	when	the	similarity	is	high	and	otherwise	reputation	will	be	decreased.
The	degree	depends	on	the	value	of	force-of-norms.	
4.	After	the	adjustments	of	the	reputation	of	the	agents	for	similarity,	agents,	who	have	been	attacked	on	a	recently	made	utterance,	get	the	opportunity	to	defend	themselves.	The	verdict	comes
from	the	environment	patches.	If	the	opinion	of	the	proponent	is	more	similar	to	the	environment	than	its	negation,	then	the	proponent	wins:	the	reward	is	subtracted	from	the	reputation	of	the
opponent	and	added	to	the	reputation	of	the	proponent.	Otherwise	the	opponent	wins:	the	reputation	of	the	proponent	is	subtracted	by	the	pay	and	the	same	value	is	added	to	the	opponent's
reputation.	
5.	The	last	task	in	a	round	is	the	adjustment	of	the	reputation	of	the	winner	and	the	loser.	The	winning	statement	is	sent	to	the	environment.	And	forgetting	takes	place.
C.7 	The	procedure	Setopinion.	When	agents	determine	an	extremeness	ordering	privately	(own	categories)	they	do	not	have	to	account	for	their	choice.	But	when	agents	share	a	common	extremeness	ordering,	they
can	only	make	opinion	adjustments	that	are	linguistically	consistent.	In	the	case	they	cannot	change	their	opinion,	they	will	suffer	reputation	damage.
C.8 	The	final	consistency	check	is	implemented	in	the	procedure	setopinion	for	the	standard	categories;	for	own	categories	this	procedure	does	nothing	and	calls	the	accept	new	opinion	code:
if	 	newly	acquired	opinion	results	in	a	linguistically	consistent	attitude	 	
then	 	accept	new	opinion	 	
else	 	pay	inconsistency	penalty	 	
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